

ANALYSIS

June 1, 2018

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Canada Housing Market Outlook: A Better Long-Term Perspective

Introduction

Canada's housing market has moved past its previous turning point and seems to have settled into an interlude of slowing house price appreciation, reduced sales, and a looser market in general. Whereas Canada's housing markets had only started to respond to the new policy measures at the time of the last Canada Housing Market Outlook report published in January, sales and price data through April indicate that the housing market has slowed substantially. Prices in Toronto have moved into correction territory after more than six months of slow decline, and have also recently started to fall in Vancouver as well. The metro areas have pulled down the RPS 13-metro composite index even though appreciation remains steady in the other larger Canada metro areas. The national composite house price index has also leveled out over the last six months.

On average, the short-term house price outlook calls for slower appreciation over the next two years followed by some recovery. Toronto and Vancouver will go through short but significant house price corrections that will bring their prices more in line with long-term trend values, whereas Montréal house prices are already near trend and will grow steadily over the next two years with a slight subsequent pickup. Despite this slower short-term outlook, the medium- and long-term outlook is looking substantially better, in part because deflating the house price bubbles in Toronto and Vancouver, while also making national mortgage lending more stringent, will improve housing affordability and debt service ratios in the long term, reducing the possibility of any extended house price correction.

The most important risks to the outlook are due to interest rates. Strong wage growth and higher energy prices leading to inflation may well prompt further interest rate tightening, which will drag on affordability. By contrast, the effects of an economic downturn such as in the Moody's Analytics protracted slump scenario will not be symmetric, as any fall in median income is unlikely to be offset by falling interest rates.

Canada Housing Market Outlook: A Better Long-Term Perspective

BY ANDRES CARBACHO-BURGOS

Canada's housing market has moved past its previous turning point and seems to have settled into an interlude of slowing house price appreciation, reduced sales, and a looser market in general. Although some of the market's slowdown is caused by restrictions put in place by the British Columbia and Ontario governments on the overheating Vancouver and Toronto housing markets, the main weapons being used to deflate the housing market bubble are the borrower stress tests on mortgage lending imposed last year by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) combined with interest rate tightening by the Bank of Canada.¹ These two clamps work together, as the Bank of Canada indirectly sets the mortgage rate used in the stress test; this rate has gone up from 4.64% in mid-2017 to 5.34% as of May. The overall effect is a pronounced slowdown in housing demand. While such a slowdown is very much in order for the overheated Toronto and Vancouver housing markets, slowing demand is also being felt in the Prairies and a few of the Atlantic provinces, pointing to the downside risk that a housing downturn in these provinces could be a contributing factor in the slide to recession.

Despite the pullback in the national housing market, the various policy tools that have been brought to bear to deflate the housing bubble and reduce affordability have proven to be fairly blunt and sometimes do not have the desired effects. For example, the Vancouver market for condo apartments has seen prices slowing but not falling, and this despite a combination of higher mortgage rates, the more stringent borrower stress test, the British Columbia transfer tax on foreign purchases, and also the tax on vacant condo apartments. In short, sometimes strong demand and a restricted supply can stymie even determined policy interventions to bring down prices. But Vancouver condos seem to be an exception. Led by declines in the Toronto and Vancouver composite

indexes, the national RPS house price index has leveled out over the past nine months and have even registered a slight decline in the last two months.

Recent Performance

Whereas Canada's housing markets had only started to respond to the new policy measures at the time of the last Canada Housing Market Outlook report published in January, sales and price data through April indicate that the housing market has slowed substantially. Home sales outside of Québec, which peaked in mid-2016 at 550,000 annualized and then slowly fell over the next year, surged again in the last months of 2017 just before the OSFI stress tests took effect. Since then, sales have fallen to only little more than 430,000 or about 21.8% from peak, according to the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA). Although listings have also fallen, the inventory-to-sales ratio has

increased from 4.3 months of sales in early 2017 to 5.5 months as of April, or about 27.9%. Sales in Québec have been less affected, with the first four months of this year indicating that 2018 sales will be about the same as the 83,000 from 2017.


Outside of Québec, the decline in sales has been largest in Vancouver and Toronto. The effects first of falling affordability and then of province and national government intervention have taken their toll in the largest metro areas. Between early 2016 and the last few months of April, total sales have fallen by nearly half in Vancouver and by close to one-third in Toronto. The smaller provinces have also been affected; Nova Scotia has been the only other province where sales have been approximately level over the past year.

Residential construction has not seen any correction, which is good news. Though relatively volatile, housing starts have averaged 220,000 annualized for the last year and a

¹ The tests took effect in January for borrowers who made a 20% or higher down payment on a home purchase, and had previously only been used for borrowers with down payments smaller than 20% of the purchase price.

Chart 1: Toronto Starts to Lose Momentum

RPS composite house prices, Jan 2010=100, SA



Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics

half, which is close to their previous cyclical peak in 2004-2005.

House prices have slowed overall. Prices in Toronto have moved into correction territory after more than six months of slow decline, and have also recently started to fall in Vancouver as well. Together, the two metro areas have pulled down the RPS 13-metro composite index even though appreciation remains steady in the other larger Canada metro areas (see Chart 1). The national composite house price index has also leveled out over the last six months.

House price dynamics for the largest 13 metro areas have changed significantly over the past six months. In September, Toronto, Hamilton and Victoria were slowing perceptibly but still had very strong year-over-year appreciation, as shown in Chart 2. Vancouver was also the only metro area where prices were momentarily accelerating. By March, however, the situation seemed to be more normal as


shown in Chart 3. Quarterly and year-over-year appreciation has slowed significantly, as shown by the much smaller axis magnitudes in the chart. While Montréal prices are still expanding, home prices in Vancouver have leveled off, and for Toronto are nearly in contraction territory after seven months of decline. Ottawa and the Prairie metro areas are showing more normal appreciation rates ranging from 2% to 5% year over year.

The slowdown in house price growth is just now starting to impact affordability. The ratio of the national median home value to median family income fell very slightly over the last two quarters, the first such decline since house prices started to accelerate in mid-2014.² This improvement

² The family series for 2016-2017 is an estimate given that there are no hard data on median family income after 2015, but median family income growth has likely slowed starting in 2016 as a result of both slower per capita GDP growth and slower growth in average wage and salary income per household.

Chart 3: ...And Continues to Slow

Composite index, 1-yr vs. 1-qr performance, 3-mo MA, Mar 2018




Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics

*Bubble size indicates # of households

Chart 2: Ontario Slowed Late Last Year...

Composite index, 1-yr vs. 1-qr performance, 3-mo MA, Sep 2017



Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics


*Bubble size indicates # of households

in the price-to-income ratio was mostly offset by rising mortgage rates; the Bank of Canada's ratio of average homeownership costs to average household disposable income has not yet started to fall, as seen in Chart 4. With mortgage rates likely to go up more over the course of the coming year, the ratio of homeownership costs to income will likely not start to fall before the end of 2019 at the earliest, which points to continuing drag on short-term housing demand.

Valuation

The Moody's Analytics forecast model for the RPS house price indexes compares current house prices to long-term trend prices. These trend prices are less sensitive to business cycles and are determined by local household income, population size, the overall new house and land price index, and, for a few metro areas, the deflated stock


Chart 4: Affordability Is Still Deteriorating



Sources: RPS, Bank of Canada, Statistics Canada, Moody's Analytics

Chart 5: Vancouver and Toronto Hit Ceiling?


RPS median house price, s-f detached, % deviation from trend



Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics

Chart 6: Condos Are Still Climbing

RPS median condo apartment price, % deviation from trend



Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics

market price index—a proxy for national wealth—interacting with metro area population dynamics. The divergence between the current price and this long-term trend price determines the degree of over- or undervaluation, which is an important driver of the house price forecast.

In addition to standard mechanisms by which an overvalued housing market tends to move into correction territory—reduced demand due to low affordability and increased supply due possibly to resurgent construction—direct policy interventions such as the new stress tests and province transfer taxes are also part of what might be called the error correction mechanism by which house prices in a region return to their long-term trend values.

The current valuation situation for single-family homes in the largest metro areas is shown in Chart 5. Several years of low demand and slowing household formation have pulled Edmonton into undervaluation territory, pointing to a strong possibility of upward price pull in coming years. Calgary, Montréal and Ottawa have had steadier demand growth and their housing markets have not benefited from large capital inflows, so their house prices are only slightly undervalued. More importantly, the steady increase in overvaluation for Toronto and Vancouver seems to be over for the near term as a combination of transfer taxes, stress tests, higher mortgage rates, and reduced affordability have pulled down on prices. Even so, single-family home prices in both metro areas are still highly overvalued

and will pull on demand for at least two years if not longer.

Though they got a later start compared with single-family home prices, condo apartment prices in Toronto and Vancouver surged ahead in the past two years and are now also seriously overvalued, as shown in Chart 6. More worrying is the fact that as of yet, the combination of transfer taxes, taxes on vacant apartments, and mortgage stress tests have not yet started to pull down prices, though there has been some slowing in Toronto.

The continued resiliency of condo apartment prices in these two metros is not just due to wealth effects, but also to insufficient supply: Chart 7 shows that apartment vacancy rates for Toronto and Vancouver are much smaller than for most of the other 11 large metro areas, with only Victoria having a tighter overall apartment market. While national residential construction has been more than sufficient to meet demand, Chart 7 seems to indicate that more resources need to be allocated to apartment construction in Toronto and Vancouver if condo apartments are to regain affordability. While apartment construction in both metro areas


is not depressed by any measure, it has been approximately level since early 2016, precisely the period in which stronger demand pressure started to push up condo prices.

The macroeconomic forecast

With stress tests for mortgage borrowers regardless of down payment size now in place and acting as a drag on demand, the remaining variable policy tool is monetary policy and its effects on mortgage rates. Unfortunately for the housing market, a tight national labor market and the possibility of inflation, plus the need to avoid serious fluctuations in the Canadian to U.S. dollar exchange rate, mean that interest rates will have a general upward trajectory for the next two years, and Canadian mortgage rates are no exception. Chart 8 shows the baseline forecast and two more extreme alternative scenarios. In the Moody's Analytics baseline outlook, the five-year adjustable mortgage

Chart 7: Tight Markets Drive Overvaluation


Vacancy rate, %, apartment structures with 6+ units



Sources: CMHC, Moody's Analytics

Chart 8: Higher Rates in Next Two Years

Avg 5-yr residential mortgage lending rate, %



Sources: Statistics Canada, Moody's Analytics

rate will move from its current rate of 4.27% to slightly over 6% by the end of 2019. If the labor market gets tighter than expected and leads to stronger wage growth, and if resurgent global energy prices also lead to cost-push effects, then the Moody's Analytics Exceptionally Strong Growth alternative scenario would apply and the five-year mortgage rate would more likely peak at slightly above 7%. By contrast, some combination of a global financial crisis and an oil price crash that hurts the Prairie provinces and Newfoundland would fit the Protracted Slump scenario, where mortgage rates would fall back to 4%, small comfort for a pronounced decline in real median income.

The general baseline outlook is shown in Table 1. The main change from the macroeconomic forecast in the previous quarterly Canada Housing Market Outlook report is the

stronger longer-term national house price outlook for the RPS indexes, as shown in the first three rows of the table. Moody's Analytics has modified its forecast model for the national house price indexes so as to put less weight on one input—the national new house and land price index—and more on median family in-

come interacting with population growth. This change does not have a major effect in the first three years of the forecast horizon, but appreciation starting in 2022 is significantly stronger than in the forecast used for the previous report.

Other elements of the table are straightforward. Monetary policy by the Bank of Canada will prevent any pickup in inflation but will also prevent the unemployment rate from falling below 6%. Housing starts will gradually pull back to around 190,000 per year due to slowing appreciation and due to current construction now slightly exceeding household formation. The ratio of outstanding mortgage debt to disposable income will gradually climb from slightly over 1.1 to 1.3 over the next five years, and that is even with the new borrower stress tests. One can see that even though CREA's assertion that the

stress tests are reducing home purchases in the Prairie provinces in the absence of a house price bubble is valid, the counterfactual is that debt-to-income ratios and debt service ratios in the Prairies would likely have increased more strongly in the absence of stress testing. The problem of balancing a potential increase in home purchases with the need to make such purchases sustainable is always a tricky one.

The regional outlook

Despite the better medium- and long-term house price outlook in the latest Moody's Analytics Canada macroeconomic forecast, the short-term outlook is less sanguine. Some of the immediate house price drivers such as per capita disposable income growth and the new-home and land price index will trend downward in the next few years (see Chart 9) and will pull down on appreciation at the same time as higher interest rates and stress tests constrain demand. Some of the undervalued housing markets, especially in Alberta, will do better despite weaker economic fundamentals precisely because they have retained better affordability, while Toronto and Vancouver will see a house price correction for at least the next year. Montréal in particular currently look like one of the healthiest housing markets in terms of avoiding both overvaluation and weak economic fundamentals.

Table 2 presents the dynamics of the short-term forecast for single-family home

Table 1: Canada Housing Market, History and Baseline Forecast

	Most recent	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Detached single-family house price index, % change *	4.6	12.0	8.0	0.1	1.1	2.5	4.6	4.6	4.1
Condo apartment price index, % change *	11.9	10.0	15.6	1.6	0.7	1.9	3.8	3.8	3.4
Composite house price index, % change *	5.0	11.2	7.8	0.1	0.7	2.1	4.3	4.3	3.9
Real per capita income, % change	1.0	0.1	2.4	2.9	1.3	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.8
Unemployment rate, %	5.8	7.0	6.3	6.0	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.5
Avg mortgage rate, 5-yr, %	4.5	3.7	3.8	4.7	5.7	6.0	6.0	6.0	6
Housing starts, ths	226.9	198.7	219.2	223.0	207.8	191.0	189.1	190.7	187.9
% change	-0.7	2.2	10.3	1.7	-6.8	-8.1	-1.0	0.8	-1.5
Ratio, median dwelling price/median family income	7.7	7.1	7.6	7.6	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.7
Ratio, outstanding mortgage debt/disp. income	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3

*Fourth qtr, yr over yr

Sources: RPS, Statistics Canada, CMHC, Moody's Analytics

Table 2: Canada Subnational Forecast, Median Detached House Price

	% deviation from trend price, 2018Q1*	% change annual- ized, 2018Q1	Avg annualized house price growth, %, 2018Q2- 2019Q1	Avg annualized house price growth, %, 2019Q2- 2020Q1
Canada		-0.6	0.3	1.6
Alberta		2.0	-0.5	-1.4
<i>Calgary, census metropolitan area</i>	-3.4	3.9	-1.4	-3.2
<i>Edmonton, census metropolitan area</i>	-18.7	1.2	0.0	-0.4
British Columbia		-1.2	-0.3	3.2
Abbotsford, census metropolitan area	42.4	8.6	-0.3	0.4
Kelowna, census metropolitan area	23.2	6.8	0.4	1.7
<i>Vancouver, census metropolitan area</i>	43.4	-4.6	-1.4	3.9
<i>Victoria, census metropolitan area</i>	16.2	5.1	3.9	2.5
Manitoba		-3.8	-1.9	1.6
<i>Winnipeg, census metropolitan area</i>	5.4	-4.8	-2.3	1.4
New Brunswick		11.7	0.2	-0.6
Moncton, census metropolitan area	3.0	18.7	-0.4	-2.5
Saint John, census metropolitan area	1.3	2.8	-0.5	-1.9
Newfoundland and Labrador		8.3	3.5	1.3
St. John's, census metropolitan area	11.7	11.0	3.8	0.7
Nova Scotia		-1.6	2.4	2.8
<i>Halifax, census metropolitan area</i>	-5.6	0.9	4.1	4.0
Ontario		-2.0	-0.7	1.3
Barrie, census metropolitan area	61.8	-5.5	-3.5	0.3
Brantford, census metropolitan area	53.2	-0.8	-2.2	-1.7
Greater Sudbury, census metropolitan area	25.5	-8.3	-6.9	-2.4
Guelph, census metropolitan area	47.3	8.3	2.9	1.1
<i>Hamilton, census metropolitan area</i>	41.2	2.0	-0.3	0.4
Kingston, census metropolitan area	3.7	9.1	1.6	-0.9
Kitchener, census metropolitan area	35.1	-0.9	-1.6	0.2
London, census metropolitan area	6.9	4.2	0.5	0.4
Oshawa, census metropolitan area	-7.0	4.4	-2.4	2.7
<i>Ottawa-Gatineau, census metropolitan area</i>	45.7	-10.2	2.3	2.7
Peterborough, census metropolitan area	33.5	-2.8	-3.5	-1.9
St. Catharines-Niagara, census metropolitan area	28.2	3.0	-0.2	0.7
Thunder Bay, census metropolitan area	36.9	-1.9	-3.9	-2.2
<i>Toronto, census metropolitan area</i>	52.7	-5.4	-1.1	2.2
Windsor, census metropolitan area	-3.9	14.8	6.6	2.1
Prince Edward Island		-2.5	1.9	2
Quebec		4.6	3.8	4
<i>Montreal, census metropolitan area</i>	-5.4	4.8	5.2	5.3
<i>Quebec, census metropolitan area</i>	29.5	5.0	2.5	2.3
Saguenay, census metropolitan area	51.0	-5.4	-1.8	0
Sherbrooke, census metropolitan area	13.7	13.8	6.6	3.4
Trois-Rivieres, census metropolitan area	41.9	-3.7	-1.9	0.2
Saskatchewan		-0.5	-5.8	-4.3
<i>Regina, census metropolitan area</i>	14.5	-3	-10	-9
<i>Saskatoon, census metropolitan area</i>	-4.7	-1.3	-3.4	-1.5


Italicized metro areas are part of the RPS 13-metro area composite index.

*Census metropolitan areas only

Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics

Chart 9: Stronger Income Growth in 2018

Macroeconomic indicators, % change yr ago, baseline forecast



Sources: Statistics Canada, Moody's Analytics

markets. The first column shows the rate of over- or undervaluation for all metro areas. A glance indicates that it is not just Toronto but most of the metro areas in the surrounding Golden Horseshoe region that suffer from overvaluation, Oshawa being the only exception. By contrast, overvaluation is not a problem in the Prairie regions, and in fact Edmonton is the only large metro area that is seriously undervalued. British Columbia housing markets are overvalued not just for Vancouver but for the other three metro areas as well. Québec presents important contrasts. Because income growth in Montréal has been relatively strong, the Montréal market is undervalued, whereas weak income growth in the other Québec metro areas has kept their house prices significantly above trend.

The second column shows the most recent rate of appreciation for each metro area, an important consideration given that housing markets are subject to significant persistence effects. Strangely enough, the strongest persistence effects will likely be found in Moncton and St. John's, both of which have had a recent burst of house price growth, while the strongest negative persistence effect in the short run is likely to be in Ottawa, where prices have started to trend down.

The third column shows the one-year forecast where persistence effects are most influential but where the correction of over- or undervaluation is still the strongest effect. Toronto and Vancouver house prices will continue to correct downward, while Mon-

tréal prices will retain steady growth. The fourth column shows 2019-2020 projected house price growth where persistence effects from the most recent house price appreciation are no longer an issue but increases in mortgage rates have become more important. Despite higher mortgage rates, the new national house price forecast and improving median income growth start to improve the overall situation: in particular, house prices in Toronto and Vancouver start to rebound.

Last, Table 3 ranks the metro area single-family house price forecasts for the 2018-2023 five-year period and also compares them with the December forecast, which was used in the January report. Thanks to stronger national house price growth projected for 2021-2023, the average annualized five-year house price growth for Canada nearly doubles from 1.4% to 2.8% despite the combined effects of higher mortgage rates, stress tests, and

Table 3: Medium-Term House Price Outlook, Census Metropolitan Areas

Avg annualized projected single-family house price growth, %, 2018Q1-2023Q1

	Dec 2017 forecast	Apr 2018 forecast
Canada	1.4	2.8
<i>Edmonton</i>	0.0	4.9
<i>Montréal</i>	3.8	4.5
<i>Halifax</i>	0.9	4.3
Sherbrooke	3.2	4.1
<i>Saskatoon</i>	2.5	4.1
<i>Ottawa-Gatineau</i>	1.4	3.4
<i>Vancouver</i>	0.6	3.3
Guelph	5.3	3.2
<i>Québec</i>	2.1	3.0
<i>Calgary</i>	-0.8	3.0
<i>Victoria</i>	-1.5	3.0
Kelowna	-0.5	2.9
Oshawa	2.3	2.6
<i>Toronto</i>	1.8	2.6
Windsor	1.5	2.6
St. John's	0.9	2.6
<i>Winnipeg</i>	-1.4	2.0
Barrie	4.6	1.9
London	1.5	1.9
<i>St. Catharines-Niagara</i>	0.9	1.6
Kitchener	1.8	1.5
<i>Hamilton</i>	0.1	1.5
Abbotsford	-0.1	1.4
<i>Regina</i>	-0.6	1.0
Kingston	0.1	0.7
Brantford	1.9	-0.3
Peterborough	1.3	-0.6
Thunder Bay	-0.7	-1.1
Trois-Rivières	1.2	-1.3
Saint John	0.3	-1.3
Saguenay	1.6	-1.5
Moncton	0.2	-1.6
Greater Sudbury	-0.3	-1.6

Italicized metro areas are part of the RPS 13-metro area composite index.

Sources: RPS, Moody's Analytics

province transfer taxes. Some metro areas do much better in the April forecast, particularly Edmonton, which will have a strong 2021-2023 house price rebound, while Montréal will also have relatively strong and steady growth. Toronto and Vancouver, which will feel the strongest effects from policy interventions, will have much more sedate five-year house price growth of 2.6% and 3.3%, respectively.

Five-year house price declines are now evident only for the much smaller Ontario and Québec metro areas and for New Brunswick, which is still hamstrung by slow income growth and a projected population decline. It should be noted that the Prairie province metro areas in general do better with the April forecast, particularly because they are more sensitive to new-home and land prices, and the new-home and land price has better growth in the latest Canada macroeconomic forecast.

On average, the house price outlook calls for slower appreciation over the next two years followed by some recovery. Toronto and Vancouver will go through short but significant house price corrections that will bring their prices more in line with long-term trend values, whereas Montréal house prices are already near trend and will grow steadily over the next two years with a slight subsequent pickup.

Risks

The most important risks to the outlook are due to interest rates and can be glimpsed in Chart 8. Strong wage growth and higher energy prices leading to inflation may well

prompt further interest rate tightening, which will further drag on affordability. By contrast, the effects of an economic downturn such as in the Moody's Analytics protracted slump scenario will not be symmetric, as any fall in median income is unlikely to be offset by falling interest rates.

Risks due to the mortgage lending stress tests are now becoming clearer though they have yet to materialize. The stress tests could be a source of downside risk or possibly of risks that future policy will be less effective. Many analysts think that the OSFI stress test for conventional borrowers with 20% down payments is too strong and will reduce actual purchase demand by creating too much financial stringency, especially in lower-income Prairie and Atlantic housing markets. The resulting downward pressure on purchases will pull down not just on home values, but also on the financial balance sheets of real estate developers and on residential construction; by trying to tamp down a housing bubble, OSFI could actually add perceptibly to the drag on Canada's GDP growth.

Conversely, the new stress test could result in a serious reshuffling of mortgage

lending as potential buyers shift from banks towards credit unions and other nonbank mortgage lenders who are not federally regulated by OSFI. This possibility would result in the stress test being less effective in reducing house prices and purchases, but also less effective in its primary goal of preserving mortgage credit quality as interest rates climb, setting the stage for a worsening of mortgage debt performance several years down the line.

Indirect risks from trade policy are less probable but are nevertheless worth keeping an eye on. It is quite possible that the Trump administration's more aggressive trade stance towards China results in collateral damage to Canada, as much Chinese manufacturing uses both components and energy from Canada; Canadian uses of Chinese inputs are not negligible either. If a U.S. trade war with China is also accompanied by difficulties in NAFTA renegotiations, and particularly if the U.S. tries to levy protection on Canadian manufactures following a NAFTA rupture, the downward effects on household income growth would definitely be felt in Canadian housing markets as well.

About the Author

Andres Carbacho-Burgos is an economist at the West Chester office of Moody's Analytics. He covers the U.S. housing market, residential construction, and U.S. regional economies. Before joining Moody's Analytics, he taught economics at Texas State University, where he also researched open-economy macroeconomics and income inequality. Born in Chile, he obtained his PhD and master's in economics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and his BA in economics from Carleton College.

About RPS Real Property Solutions



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